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... AND CONTRACTUAL CONSENT 
~y E. BARNErr* 
Although the title of this symposium is "Default Rules and Con-
tractual Consent," the contributors have devoted the bulk of their 
papers to the issue of default rules and very little, if any, to the role 
that consent plays, either in contract or in the default rules debate.1 
In these comments, I intend to rectify this imbalance by concentrating 
on the issue of contractual consent. I do so because I consider it my 
duty to try to inject the proper sensitivity to contractual consent when-
ever this aspect of contract theory has slipped between the cracks. As 
I proceed, however, readers may wish to keep in mind something that 
my late and very dearly beloved grandfather used to say to me. 
"Randella," he would say, "I'm so glad that I have a grandson like 
you, because if I had two grandsons like you, I don't know what I 
would do." Just be grateful there is one (and only one) of my ilk in 
this symposium. 
The approaches to default rules presented by the symposium par-
ticipants can be divided into three groups: the economists, the philos-
ophers, and the atheists. The economists, such as Ian Ayres and Jason 
Johnston, argue that default rules should be set so as to maximize effi-
ciency. The philosophers, such Steven Burton and Richard Warner, 
think that default rules should be set so as to better conform contrac-
tual enforcement to the requirements of justice. The atheists, such as 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This article is based on remarks 
made to the "Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent," held at the University of 
Southern California Law Center, March 12-13, 1993. I have retained much of the informality of 
those remarks. 
1. But see Lisa Bernstein, Social Nonns and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL.lNTERDISc. 
LJ. 59,73-74 {1993) {discussing the implications of competing legal systems on the consensual 
nature of legal regimes); Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a 
Contract, 3 S. CAL. lNTERDISc. LJ. 115, 154-55 {1993) (arguing that consent is limited in its 
ability to justify default rules); Richard Craswell, Default Rules, Efficiency, and Prudence, 3 S. 
CAt..INmRDISC. LJ. 289, 296-97 {1993) {"If parties have more accurate information about their 
own needs, and if the market is working well, the parties' choices may be a more reliable guide 
to the allocation that is really efficient than the decision of even the most well-informed judge or 
legislature."). 
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Jay Feinman anq Dennis Patterson, do not believe in the entire 
default rules conceptual scheme. 
In these comments I respond to the arguments made by the prin-
cipal paper authors in three different ways. In Part I, I contend that 
when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractual 
consent, they are missing the crucial problem of legitimacy. In Parts II 
and IV, I respond to the criticisms of my consent theory of contract 
advanced by Jay Feinman and Dennis Patterson. Both Feinman and 
Patterson object to the enterprise in which I and others are engaging, 
and I shall explain why each is wrong to dismiss the current debate 
over default rules. Fmally, in contrast, in Part m I will try to show 
how Steven Burton's theory of default rules, which I find most conge-
nial, is quite compatible with mine despite the fact that he thinks we 
disagree. 
I. EFFICIENCY AND LEGITIMACY 
In .this section, I do not intend to respond directly to the articles 
and comments of those in this symposium who are pursuing a law-
and-economics approach.2 Instead, I will discuss this approach in a 
general fashion. I will try to identify what I think an efficiency 
approach to default rules misses that is better captured by other 
approaches. I begin by asserting what I have asserted elsewhere: that 
theories are problem-solving devices.3 That is, theories are human 
intellectual constructs that are formulated to solve some intellectual 
problem. According to this View, theories can best be evaluated by 
analyzing the nature of the problem they seek to solve and by how 
well they solve it as compared with rival theories. Often what sepa-
rates theorists or schools of thought are not so much the validity of 
their claims, but disagreements about the existence, naiure or relative 
importance of the underlying problems they seek to address. 
There is also what might be called a "motivational" implication of 
this pragmatic view of theorizing that is not often recognized: you will 
2. In their contributions, both Jason Johnston and Ian Ayres continue their research 
projects of analyzing the problem of selecting default rules from an efficiency perspective. See 
Jason S. Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Good 
Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDisc. LJ. 335 (1993); Ian Ayres, 
Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. LJ. 1 
(1993). 
3. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent. Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 269 
(1986) ("Theories are problem-solving devices. We assess the merits of a particular theory by its 
ability to solve the problems that gave rise to the need for a theory."). 
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not care about or value a theory unless you care about the problem it 
is formulated to solve. This is one reason why law students, for exam-
ple, are often indifferent or even hostile to the presentation of theo-
ries in the classroom. They simply have not wrestled with the subject 
long enough or hard enough to appreciate the intellectual problems 
that particular theories are intended to ·solve. To interest most stu-
dents in contract theory you must first get them to appreciate the 
problems that these theories are supposed to address. 
I maintain that what separates the economists from the non-econ-
omists-or what I call here the "philosophers," meaning philosoph-
ically-inclined lawyers-is the fact that these two groups are 
concerned about two very different problems, and therefore each 
group finds useful a very different theory than the other. Conversely, 
members of each group do not care much about the problems of con-
cern to the other group and therefore fail to grasp the point of the 
other group's theories. And even if they do see the point of these 
theories in the abstract, these theories just do not matter to them very 
much. 
This situation is not, however, completely symmetrical. I think 
the philosophers tend to understand the kind of problems that the 
economists are addressing even though they may not themselves be 
addressing these problems. I also think most thoughtful non-econo-
mist contract theorists appreciate what the economists are trying to 
accomplish. But it has been my experience both in dabbling in the 
literature as well as attending conferences such as this symposium-
and here I am, perhaps, overgeneralizing a bit to make a point-that 
the economists neither understand nor appreciate the kind of problem 
that the philosophers are preoccupied with. For this reason, while 
many philosophers are rather sympathetic and tolerant of the eco-
nomic way of thinking and are willing to integrate that approach into 
a larger normative view of law,4 I find there is much less generosity 
extended in the other direction. By and large, economists are rather 
indifferent, if not antagonistic, to more philosophical approaches to 
contract theory. They simply do not view such approaches as useful 
ways of looking at contract law because they basically do not care 
4. Although many-but far from all-on the political left are unremittingly critical of law-
and-economics, these same persons are likely to be equally unsympathetic to nonleftist philo-
sophical approaches as well. Jay Feinman's contn'bution to this symposium probably falls into 
this category. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL.!NrERDISC. 
LJ. 43 (1993). 
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about or understand the problems that these philosophically inclined 
lawyers are addressing. 
What are these problems about which lawyer-economists are 
indifferent? One stands out: the problem of legitimacy. By legiti-
macy I mean the answer to the questions, What gives one party the 
right to recruit the power of a court to enforce a judgment against the 
other party? What gives a court the authority to intervene? In sum, 
how is contractual enforcement to be justified? By "justified," I mean 
something like morally as opposed to legally justified. By "morally," I 
mean that such enforcement is proper or just; it is what ought to occur. 
In his contribution to this symposium, Steven Burton offers the fol-
lowing moral criticism of efficiency theories: 
To be legitimate, a default principle should require the parties to do 
that which they have a genuine political obligation to do. But indi-
viduals have no general obligation to do the efficient thing, and it is 
mysterious why parties to result-indeterminate contracts might have 
such obligations when people generally do not. Even if efficiency 
justified enforcing deals the parties never made, the justification for 
enforcing a deal made by the parties is not a justification for enforc-
ing a deal they did not make.5 
Lawyer-philosophers believe that this is a genuine problem that needs 
to be addressed. Lawyer-economists generally do not share this con-
cern-at least not in their scholarship. Or, if they do care, they 
assume without much, if any, argument that some version of an effi-. 
ciency approach is a satisfactory answer to this problem. 
Nothing of what I have said so far applies to the purely positive 
or descriptive and explanatory uses of economics. Such uses of eco-
nomic theory address distinctly non-normative questions (though the 
answers to these questions may affect significantly more normative 
inquiries). My gross generalizations about economists are intended to 
apply to circumstances in which economists are making explicit nor-
mative claims6 (which are rare) or are implicitly making normative 
claims (which I think happens all the time). In either of these circum-
stances this friction between the philosopher and economist lawyers is 
likely to develop. 
5. Burton, supra note 1, at 138·39. 
6. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. '07, 91 (1989) ("This Article provides a theory of 
how courts and legislatures should set default rules.") (emphasis added). 
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What the many philosophically inclined lawyers who are other-
wise sympathetic to economic analysis are really asking of the econo-
mists is not that they present completely satisfying answers to the 
problem of legitimacy-something that no one has presented to 
date-but that they come out of the closet and grapple with lawyer-
philosophers in trying to articulate a justification of the implicit nor-
mative claims economists are often making. What rankles is the supe-
rior posture assumed by some economists who remain silent on the 
question of legitimacy, while belittling those who are pursuing a more 
philosophical agenda. 
Ten or fifteen years ago there was a round of debates in the litera-
ture about this issue. Richard Posner was very active in it as was Ron-
ald Dworkin? That debate exhausted itself, just as the current default 
rules debate will eventually exhaust itself. Scholars of all stripes said 
what they then had to say about the normative implications of law and 
economics and then withdrew from the field. Nonetheless, I do think 
the outcome of that debate was that the ball was left in the econo-
mists' court. The way I read the literature, the critics of the legitimacy 
of economic analysis had the better of the day; and that is where the 
situation was left in stasis. Having survived is not the same thing as 
having prevailed, and it would not hurt economists to revisit the nor-
mative questions once in a while. 
In his remarks at the symposium, Alan Schwartz posited the situ-
ation facing a future Russian le~lature trying to decide whether to 
adopt some version of the Uniform Commercial Code. He asked 
what more we could tell such a legislature beyond the fact that a par-
ticular commercial code was more or less efficient. My answer is that, 
while an efficiency analysis might be relevant to such a legislative 
decision, it is hardly sufficient. For legislatures enact statutes that not 
only identify punishable behavior, but also purport to create a duty of 
obedien<!e in the citizenry. Rightly or wrongly, most people believe 
that they have a duty to obey a properly enacted statute. For this 
belief to be warranted, statutes must have whatever quality or quali-
ties engender such a duty. Perhaps efficiency is that quality, but I for 
one would disagree. 
7. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); 
Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 'Zl1 
(1980); Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. 
LEGAL Sroo. 243 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors Calabresi 
and Posner, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 563 (1980); see also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and 
Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFSTRA L. RE.v. 509 (1980). 
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If I were a resident of the Poletown neighborhood of Detroit, and 
the city authorities came to me and said that I and all my neighbors 
must vacate our homes and shops so that a GM Cadillac assembly 
plant can be built on our land, would I have a moral duty to obey this 
order? That is, would I be justified if I exercise self-defense when the 
bulldozers come to raze my house, or would I have a duty adhere to 
the dictate? One possible answer to this question is that a duty of 
obedience exists if this edict was properly or "legally" enacted. But, 
to be frank, this answer without much more tells me little about why I 
might have a duty to obey a legally valid command. History is replete 
with examples of properly enacted yet unjust orders that we all agree 
carried with them no duty of obedience. Perhaps this edict is one of 
them (it surely feels like one of them to me). And this decree carries 
very little more weight with me even if I am persuaded by an econo-
mist that it is efficient that I and my neighbors abandon our lives and 
our common bonds and disperse to the four comers of the United 
States so that a new GM plant can be built. 
So this, I think, is the burden that is being placed on the econo-
mists by the philosophers. Not every critic of law-and-economics con-
tends that its methods are completely irrelevant to the normative 
problem of distinguishing binding from nonbinding obligations. I for 
one have written about the potential relevance of economic analysis.8 
But neither do I think that economic analysis alone can answer the 
normative question. Nor do I think that most economists have 
attempted to tell us exactly (or even approximately) how their 
approach is relevant to the normative question of whether the people 
of Poletown have a moral obligation to accept the compensation that 
is being offered and to abandon their homes and community so that a 
GM plant can be built. Indeed, the fact that most economists are so 
indifferent to the theories that have attempted to come to grips with 
this question suggests to me that they are indifferent to the question 
itself-at least as theorists. 
To be fair, some economists might concede that a major differ-
ence between contract law and my Poletown example is that, unlike 
the law of eminent domain, most of the rules of contract law are 
default rules that can be contracted around by the parties. The moral-
ity of enforcing rules of contractual transfer that apply by default is 
8. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Of Chickens and Eggs-The Compatibility of Moral 
Rights and Consequentialist Analyses, 12 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 611 (1989). 
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somehow distinguishable from an immutable law that empowers gov-
ernment to condemn people's houses. 
In my view, however, any such response implicitly invokes the 
concept of consent to legitimate this type of legal enforcement. What 
makes default rules different from the immutable law of eminent 
domain is the freedom of contract that parties can exercise to deflect 
the operation of contract law, in contrast to the residents of Poletown 
who must get out of the bulldozer's way. And in some circumstances, 
when parties fail to exercise their power to alter the law of contract 
for their transaction, their silence has a normative consequence as 
well.9 
So when economists point to the difference between default rules 
and the sort of immutable rules that eminent domain represents, they 
are pointing to consent. Yet when I have laid the consent thesis on 
the doorstep of economists, it has been somewhat of an unwelcome 
baby. This indifference is exemplified by Richard Craswell's highly 
critical treatment of my approach in his Michigan Law Review arti-
cle.10 Although Professor Craswell is willing to be nice to me in social 
gatherings, and in his article he tries-and you can see he is striving 
mightily-to be polite about what I've written, it is patent that he just 
does not think my thesis matters very much. He demands to know 
what difference a consent approach makes in the normal run of con-
tract disputes. I think this is because he does not consider the legiti-
macy question to be either very important or very interesting. 
When another economist such as Alan Schwartz formulates his 
question about the Russian parliament in a conference on contract 
law, there is implicit in his. analogy the notion that the commercial 
code under consideration is going to be a set of default rather than 
immutable rules, and that is what makes these rules somehow distin-
guishable from the edict in the Poletown case. In my writings, I am 
trying to put my finger on the "somehow,-at least with regard to the 
issue of legitimacy. From the legitimacy standpoint, :what is the differ-
ence between those two regimes? I think this is a question both worth 
asking and worth answering. 
9. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REv. 821 (1992). 
10. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 
88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 523-28 (1989). 
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None of this is to deny that-the legitimacy question to one 
side-positive efficiency analysis may not have something quite inter-
esting and valuable to say about default rules that are discovered and 
normatively justified by some other means. To use Dennis Patterson's 
terminology,ll efficiency theory may tell us something descriptive 
about contract law. But although it may tell us something descriptive 
about the consequences of the default rules that are chosen by legisla-
tors or judges and although these consequences may well have impor-
tant normative implications, efficiency theory alone cannot tell us how 
legislators or judges ought to determine the content of default rules or 
whether the default rules so determined are normatively justified. 
Moreover, economic analysis may provide us with consequential-
ist reasons why consent is a prerequisite of contract that, taken 
together with other reasons, provide a normative justification for 
requiring such contractual consent.12 But a consent to be legally 
bound is what gets contract off the ground such that filling gaps in 
consent becomes an issue. Or, to put the matter as I have elsewhere, 
we are only concerned with the concept of default rules at all because 
we are or ought to be committed to honoring the consensual obliga-
tions of the parties to a transfer of entitlements, and the consensual 
origin of this obligation also figures in the way we fill gaps in parties' 
consentP More than passing reference must be made to contractual 
consent if an efficiency account of default rules is to have normative 
implications. 
All this is missed by the sort of efficiency analysis that purports to 
tell us-by recourse to efficiency analysis alone-which default rules 
courts should adopt. With rare exception,l4 efficiency theorists con-
tinue to talk solely to each other and, consequently, nonefficiency the-
orists are unmoved by much of their labor. 
11. See Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate Over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. 
CAL. !mERDISC. LJ. 235, 239-40 (1993). 
I d. 
12. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 1. 
13. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 826-27. 
{T]he concept of default rules reveals consent to be operating at two distinct levels of 
contract theory. FliSt, the presence of consent to be legally bound is essential to justify 
the legal enforcement of any default rules. Second, nested within this overall consent 
to be legally bound, consent also operates to justify the selection of particular default 
rules. 
14. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 10 (criticizing promise, consent, and misrepresentation 
theories of contract). 
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Jay Feinman contends that the current discourse over default 
rules "just leaves [him] cold."15 I cannot say that I blame him. For, as 
I have tried to show,16 the concept and rhetoric of default rules under-
mines the now-hoary rhetoric of the legal realist critiques of consen-
sual obligation that underlies those versions of relationalism that are 
intended to serve a leftist or communitarian, as opposed to a liberal, 
political agenda. 
Realists pointed to the gaps in contractual assent and gleefully 
observed that policy must be operating where the parties are silent. 
And since contractual silence is pervasive, the realm of state-imposed 
policy-driven default rules covers most of the contract law terrain, 
overwhelming in importance any consent-based obligation. Of 
course, in the hands of some neorealists and all Critical Legal Studies 
(CLS) and communitarian relationalists, this realist critique is used 
not merely to put contractual consent in its proper place, but to 
delegitimize it altogether. And in the academic world this argumenta-
tive ploy worked all too well. 
Owing largely to the insights of law-and-economics scholars in 
the corporate law arena and imported into contract theory by other 
legal economists, the concept of default rules has helped to stem this 
seemingly irresistible tideP It turns out that, just as silence is perva-
sive when parties are contracting, default rules are pervasive in filling 
this void. And since default rules can be displaced by the manifested 
assent of the parties, consent is always lurking in the background, just 
as an operating system such as MS-DOS is always in the background 
of the computer applications software we currently use. This is true 
notwithstanding the fact that the only time most of us are aware of 
DOS is when we boot up our computer. In other words, contractual 
consent is (at a minimum) the shell program that must be run before 
our gap-filling program can work. It can no more be dispensed with 
than can the operating system of our computers. In contract law, a 
manifested consent to be legally bound is what justifies a court in 
enforcing default rules on parties who made incomplete commitments 
to each other, however those default rules are chosen. 
15. Feinman, supra note 4, at 44. 
16. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 822-28. 
17. I give full credit to economists for seeing what was before our very eyes but had been 
missed. I fault them for failing to appreciate fully the implications of what they saw. 
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This insight alone would make the concept of default rules a pow-
erful antidote to communitarian relational theory. But there is more. 
Once we realize that contractual consent is what gets contracts up and 
running, and that it always is in the background of parties' silence, we 
can see that contractual consent can play a further role in telling us 
how the gaps in _consent should be filled. For even when parties are 
silent, they are making a near limitless number of tacit assumptions 
about the world they inhabit. In sum, nested within an overall consent 
to be legally bound that justifies the enforcement of default rules, is 
another consent based on tacit assumptions that unavoidably colors 
the meaning of what parties make explicit and provides the sound of 
silence.18 
Although these tacit assumptions are not conscious, they are 
nonetheless quite real and they account for much, though not all, of 
the parties' silence. Therefore, if the default rules of contract are to 
reflect the agreement actually made by the parties, we must make an 
effort to conform to these pervasive tacit understandings. But how? 
It is really not so hard as it would at first appear. For most of what 
anyone takes for granted, everyon~ takes for granted. When it comes 
to tacit assumptions, people, at least people in the same community of 
discourse, ar~ more alike than different. Consequently, sometimes 
these tacit understandings can be diScerned by examining the course 
of dealings between the parties; at other times they can be found by 
examining the custom and usage in the trade. These are the normal 
interpretive techniques by which silence has traditionally been inter-
preted. And when these sources of conventional common sense are 
unavailing, the more formal rationality analysis provided by econo-
mists and the moral analysis provided by philosophers can discern 
what presumably rational and fair persons would have desired, thus 
18. The first contracts scholar to acknowledge explicitly the importance of tacit assump-
tions to contract theocy and doctrine was Lon Fuller. See LoN L. FuLLER, BASIC CoNTRAcr 
LAW 666-70 (1947). 
Words like "intention," "assumption," "expectation" and "understanding" all seem to 
imply a conscious state involving an awareness of alternatives and a deliberate choice 
among them. It is, however, plain that there is a psychological state which can be 
described as a "tacit assumption" that does not involve a consciousness of alternatives. 
The absent-minded professor stepping from his office into the hall as he reads a book 
"assumes" that the floor of the hall will be there to receive him. His conduct is condi-
tioned and directed by this assumption, even though the possibility that the floor has 
been removed does not "occur'' to him, that is, is not present in his conscious mental 
processes. 
Id. at 666. 
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providing evidence of what rational and fair parties did in fact tacitly 
assume in a particular case.19 
Nonetheless, I concede that tacit assumptions do not entirely fill 
the silent void of contractual incompleteness.20 Still, if this was all 
that consent theory had to say about contract, we see a very different 
picture than the one painted by neorealist communitarian relational 
theory. In place of small islands of consented-to terms amid a sea of 
state-imposed policy-driven obligations, we see islands of imposed-by-
law terms in a sea of consent-based obligation. Little wonder that 
CLS-relationalist Jay Feinman does not "feel that most of the mem-
bers of the default rules group are [his] soul mates.,21 
But I have argued that the role of consent is not limited even by 
the vast domain of shared tacit assumptions. Consent may still justify 
the use of conventionalist default rules where no such assumptions 
exist. When parties have no shared tacit understandings, one-time 
contracting parties may tacitly be making a conventional assumption, 
while the other party-often a repeat player guided by legal counsel-
is not. By adopting a conventionalist default rule, we can be more 
assured that agreements will reflect the actual assent of the parties by 
inducing such repeat players to reveal their unconventional assump-
tions to less sophisticated parties. In this way, the legally unsophisti-
cated are put on notice of the intentions of the other side and may 
then either consent, bargain, or walk away. No matter what the rela-
tive bargaining power of the parties may be, bargaining behavior will 
not occur if one party's unconventional intentions are unknown to 
another party who is making more conventional assumptions. 
By this route, the role of contractual consent is enhanced by the 
use of conventionalist default rules that bring the parties' actual or 
subjective assent closer to the meaning that they objectively manifest 
to each other.22 Moreover, although the legitimating character of con-
sent may run out at some point, it can be revived in a legal order 
comprised of freely competing legal systems.23 As Lisa Bernstein has 
19. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 906-11. 
20. But see Andrew Kull, Mistake. Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Rem-
edies, 43 HAsn:Nos LJ.l, 51 (1991) {"The contractual allocation of potential frustration losses is 
not only theoretically possible, it is effectively being made all the time."). 
21. Feinman, supra note 4, at 44. 
22. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 885-92. 
23. Id. ("If meaningful competition among legal systems existed, ••• a general consent to 
be legally bound ••• might be construed as including a genuine consent even to those immutable 
rules that one cannot contract around."). 
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noticed,24 alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are a step in this 
direction. 
Jay Feinman ignores all this, preferring instead to caricature the 
approach as "posit[ing] that contracting actors are calculating, self-
interested social isolates who engage in transactions the scope and 
content of which are well-defined by the parties."25 While Feinman 
provides no evidence for this assertion, I cannot insist that no default 
rule theorist has ever made such an assumption. I can, however, deny 
that I have. My account of default rules recognizes that when parties 
are rational, self-interested, and well-informed about the legal back-
ground rules, we may infer their consent to any default rule that a 
legal system may adopt. We adopt conventionalist default rules, how-
ever, precisely to cover those great many persons who do not fit this 
description.26 In other words, if Feinman's characterization of my 
approach to default rules were correct, my endorsement of conven-
tionalist default rules would not only be insupportable, but also inex-
plicable. To the contrary,. such default rules are needed precisely 
because individuals in a community of discourse are deeply embedded 
in a complex social matrix with others from whom they absorb and 
with whom they share a vast repository of tacit assumptions about 
their world-assumptions that they could not make completely 
explicit if they tried. Therefore, default rules of contract should 
reflect wherever possible these social understandings. 
Echoing Ian Macneil, Feinman asserts that "looking at default 
rules as a validation of consent is incoherent unless one waters down 
consent to such an extent that it is unrecognizable."27 Elsewhere I 
have challenged Ian Macneil's double vision of contractual consent.28 
On the one hand, when Macneil criticizes classical and neoclassical 
contract theory, "consent" means conscious, deliberate consent or else 
it is fictitious.29 On the other hand, when developing his own theory, 
24. See Bernstein, supra note 1. 
25. Feinman, supra note 4, at 51. 
26. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 9, at 895 ("[I]f only one party can be counted on to know 
the law, the law should adopt a conventionalist default rule reflecting the common sense under-
standing of the community to which the rationally ignorant party belongs."). 
27. Feinman, supra note 4, at 54. Compare this with IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SociAL 
CoNTRAcr 49 (1980) (classical contract stretched the term consent "through an imaginative 
array of fictions. In that approach the norm of effectuation of consent was carried on to a fare-
thee-well."). 
28. See Randy E. Barnett, Canjlicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Tlte-
ory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REv. 1175 (1992). 
29. See id. at 1182-84. 
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Macneil repeatedly uses a more realistic conception of consent that is 
quite compatible with the one I have employed in my writings.30 I 
shall not rehearse this evidence here, but it was gleaned from an 
examination of every one of Ian Macneil's published writings on rela-
tional theory. Were Feinman to permit me to use just the same 
notions of consent that Macneil himself uses {however inconsistently 
with his other more communitarian arguments with which I disagree), 
my analysis of default rules would work quite nicely. Instead, with a 
simple wave of his hand, Feinman dismisses in this single unsupported 
sentence the multifaceted analysis of consent that I presented in my 
writings and which, I have argued, is compatible with Macneil's own. 
Perhaps this is an example of neorealist whistling past the graveyard. 
ill. CONSENT AND THE AUTHORITY OF CONTRACT 
Because I find myself in general agreement with Steven Burton's 
insightful contribution to the default rules literature, responding to his 
criticisms of my treatment of default rules is particularly-difficult. He 
thinks he is disagreeing with me, and who am I to say otherwise. 
Nonetheless, I will try to demonstrate how, with one possible excep-
tion, we are really defending the same turf whether he likes it or not. 
Burton starts with the proposition that I defended at length and 
which I have already mentioned in my comment on Jay Feinman's 
paper: "The problem of default principles arises only after an impor-
tant political judgment has already been made-that individuals 
should enjoy freedom of contract in some domain of sociallife."31 He 
and I agree that "[c]ontract law, like all law, should have legitimacy; it 
should enforce only the genuine political obligations of the people 
subjected to official coercion. The law legitimately enforces agree-
ments because parties have obligations to adhere to their agreements 
(pacta sunt servanda)."32 Further he acknowledges his agreement 
with me that "where both parties are rationally informed and thus 
might contract around any default rules, their silence often enough 
will represent consent to the default rules supported by the conven-
tions of their community."33 He agrees as well that 
30. See id. at 1184-90. 
31. Burton, supra note 1, at 117. 
32. Id. 
33. I d. at 154. Note that my claim is stronger here. Under these conditions, silence can be 
taken to be consent to any default rule, even unconventional ones. 
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when neither party is rationally informed and can be counted on to 
contract around a default rule, both nonetheless may share tacit 
assumptions on the point. The law should use default rules that 
track those shared tacit assumptions which are likely to track the 
conventions of the relevant community. In both cases, the parties 
agree implicitly to do the conventional thing, which is also likely to 
be the most salient solution to their coordination problem.34 
Nevertheless, Burton denies that the full gamut of default rules 
can be justified on the basis of consent. He argues that "[t]o support 
the contract's legitimate auth,ority, consent must be voluntary, know· 
ing, and deliberate. Even tacit assumptions thus may not rest on con· 
sent."35 Although I am unsure how much we disagree about this 
matter, I do not think that the moral implications of consent are as 
limited as Burton suggests. Burton appears to adopt here a highly 
subjective account of consent that requires actual consciousness and 
deliberation. Yet elsewhere in his wonderful discussion of "The Case 
of the Homunculean Explorers,''36 he insightfully challenges the rigid 
dichotomy between objective and subjective assent that is exploited 
by critics of liberal contract theory such as Peter Linzer and Ian Mac· 
neil. According to Burton and his colleague Eric Andersen, "two per· 
sons cannot contract unless they participate in a social practice of 
contracting. . . . The intention of the act of promising is the world 
·represented by the terms of the promise, interpreted in accordance 
with the conventions of the relevant language community ..•. "37 
The relevant conception of consent that justifies the enforcement 
of commitments is a communicated consent, that is, voluntary acts that 
express an intention to be legally bound. This act of communicating 
consent can justify the enforcement of any default rule when parties 
are· rationally informed, and can justify the enforcement of conven· 
tionalist default rules under many circumstances where they are not. 
This is so because communicating consent to be legally bound means 
that one also implicitly communicates acceptance of the jurisdiction of 
some court that may be called upon to interpret one's agreement. For 
communicated consent to create the moral obligation to adhere to the 
34. Id. (footnote omitted). 
35. Id. (footnote omitted}. 
36. Steven J. Burton, Comments on Professor Linzer's Paper, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 
199, 201-02. 
37. Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andexsen, The World of a Contract, 75 IowA L. REv. 861, 
864 (1990). 
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expressed and implicit terms of one's agreement does not require as 
stringent a conception of consent as Burton appears to think.38 
I do not think, however, that this consent to jurisdiction is with-
out limits. Just as I argued that one can be said to consent to any 
default rule only "when the transaction costs of discovering and con-
tracting around the default rules are sufficiently low,"39 the same is 
true of the other (default) rules governing a legal system.40 When 
these conditions are not met, I argued that default rules should reflect 
the conventional understanding of the community of discourse of 
which both parties are members. Similarly, when one has consented 
to a legal jurisdiction, one consents only to the imposition of a "fair" 
and just legal process, in much the same way as one implicitly (and 
conceptually) consents to perform in good faith whenever one enters 
into a contract. Nonetheless, in the realm of contract (as opposed to 
tort or restitution), this consent to jurisdiction conveys or legitimatizes 
jurisdiction. In sum, consent to jurisdiction is not a consent to all the 
rules entailed by the legal relations to which consent was given, 
whatever they may be, except under special circumstances. In the 
absence of these circumstances, when a party consents to jurisdiction, 
the rules followed by a legal system must also be both fair and just if 
they are to be morally binding on a party to a contract. 
In making this argument I do not think I am contending for any-
thing that Burton is not himself defending. To the contrary, I take 
Burton's own theory of default rules, based on "the fairness of doing 
one's part to maintain a cooperative scheme from which one derives 
benefits,"41 to be an argument along the same lines. For here, as in his 
path-breaking work on the obligation of good faith performance, Bur-
ton is going beyond the merely conventional meaning of a particular 
contractual act and elaborating on its conceptual meaning. That is, 
38. Cf. Merton L. Ferson, The Fonnation of Simple Contracts, 9 CoRNELL L.Q. 402, 407 
{1924). 
I d. 
The fact [sic] that juristic acts do at times belie the subjective state of the actor, that 
such acts are sometimes ambiguous, that courts sometimes for practichl reasons genera~ 
Iize by assimilating acts of a given kind with seeming disregard of the particular actor's 
mind, do not disprove the rationale or principle that a man may, by an act symbolic of 
his consent, subtract from his legal position. 
39. Barnett, supra note 9, at 866. 
40. Consent to jurisdiction may also confer legitimacy on immutable rules in a legal order 
that permits a choice among competing legal systems. See id. at 905. For a sketch of the possible 
operation of such a system, see Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part Tho-
Crime Prevention and the Legal Order, CluM. Jusr. Ennes, Wmter/Spring 1986, at 30, 3747. 
41. Burton, supra note 1, at 156. 
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just as he argued that to consent to contract was conceptually to comN 
mit oneself to a duty of good faith performance, so too does a consent 
to contract conceptually commit a party to coordinate his or her 
actions with those of the other party, either by explicit agreement or 
by adherence to salient gap-fillers (whether these be default or immuN 
table rules). 
All I deny is that this is a "consent-independent justification" of 
default rules. Rather, throughout his explication of his fairness and 
coordination approach he repeatedly relies on consent, even when he 
avoids using this term. Let me give some examples: Burton says that 
"[b]y entering a contract, each party signifies that the benefits exceed 
the costs of cooperation to him or her. Though one party may later 
regret that judgment, it is fair to hold them to it if keeping contracts 
counts for anything. A contract is a voluntary cooperative scheme 
between two parties, neither of whom is thrusting benefits on the 
other."42 In my lexicon, "entering a contract ... voluntar[ily]" meaps 
manifesting an intention to be legally bound, or consent. Therefore 
consent, as I use the term, gets Burton's fairness argument off the 
ground. In sum, his fairness argument is consent-based, as is his reply 
to Nozick's criticism of Rawls: "Acknowledging the force of Nozick's 
criticism, we might add that a contract involves each party's assent 
based on its judgment that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the 
costs to him or her."43 
Fmally, consider Burton's summary of his argument: "The 
default obligation to coordinate is not a background political obliga-
tion like those based in economic efficiency or communitarian values. 
It arises from the voluntary acts of individuals in forming a conN 
tract."44 Once again, "the voluntary acts of individuals in forming a 
contract" is what I mean by consent. Thus, when Burton concludes 
that "[b ]y comparison with other proposed default principles, how-
ever, the coordination principle .... rests on a sound ground of polit-
ical obligation-fairness,"45 he need only have added that the 
obligatory nature of the fairness principle in tum rests upon the parN 
ties' consent. 
Consequently, I take the thrust of Burton's analysis to be harmoN 
nious with mine. I have long been attracted to the coordination norm 
42. ld. at 159-60 (emphasis added). 
43. Id. at 162 (emphasis added). 
44. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
45. Id. at 165. 
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and even the salience criteria, having been stimulated by the writings 
of Axelrod46 and Sugden.47 I cited both of these writers in my Vir-
ginia Law Review discussion of how freedom from contract can con-
tribute to the evolution of a cooperative regime of reciprocity.48 I had 
not, however, incorporated their insights into my analysis of the 
choice of default rules. Burton's argument points towards a way of 
expanding the analysis I have presented. 
Where we part company, however, is over what it takes to "enter 
into a contract." In this article as well as his other writings, Burton 
appears to accept that the act of promising is enough to create a con-
tractual obligation of the sort that is needed to justify legal enforce-
ment. I have argued that more than a promise is required: we need to 
find a manifested intention to be legally bound, or a manifested inten-
tion to create legal relations. This is a principle that animates English 
law,49 and one that has unfortunately been lost to us in large part due 
to the efforts of Samuel Williston.50 If I am right, then perhaps the 
reason why Burton thinks he and I are disagreeing is that when he 
speaks of "the voluntary acts of individuals in forming a contract," he 
means something different than I do. But even if this is true, then he 
cannot criticize a consent theory for inadequately respecting the 
authority of contract merely because it rests on a more restrictive 
notion of contractual consent than his theory does. Whatever notion 
of consent one adopts-mere promise or promise plus intention to 
create legal relations-the rest of Burton's analysis follows and helps 
provides the justification of enforcement we both seek. 
IV. IS THE DEBATE ABOUT DEFAULT RULES 
AFALSEONE? 
Dennis Patterson, in his contribution, questions the significance, 
not only of my approach to default rules, but of everyone else's as 
46. See RoBERT AxELRoD, Ta:e EvoLunON OF CooPERATION (1984). 
47. See RoBERT SuGDEN, Ta:e EcoNoMics OF Rioms, Co-oPERATION AND WELFARE 
(1986). 
48. Barnett, supra note 9, at 851 n.68. 
49. See M.P. FuRMSToN, CHESHIRE & FIFooT's LAw OF CoNTRAcr 97 {lOth ed. 1981) 
("[IJn addition to the phenomena of agreement and the presence of consideration, a third con-
tractual element is required-the intention of the parties to create legal relations."). 
50. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRActS§ 21 {1981) ("Neither real nor apparent 
intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract ••• "); 1 
SAMUEL WILUSToN & WALTER H. JAEGER, A TREATISE oN THE LAw oF CoNTRAcrs § 21 (3d 
ed. 1957) {"The common law does not require any positive intention to create a legal obligation 
as an element of contract."). 
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well.51 He joins with his colleague Jay Feinman in rejecting the entire 
conceptual enterprise. Although I disagree with him, I found his 
paper very helpful in clarifying the precise nature of the claims that I 
and others are making. 
Patterson's critique stems from a distinction he makes between a 
proposition about law and a proposition of law: 
[A proposition about law] attributes some trait or property to the 
law. • • • To justify the assertion that a proposition about the law is 
true, one needs to show the truth of the proposition in ways appro-
priate to it. Thus, a proposition about the fairness of law will be 
shown to be true through the use of the tools of moral philosophy. 
Likewise, if the asserted proposition is an economic proposition, the 
truth of the proposition will be demonstrated in the language of 
economics.52 
He contrasts this with propositions of law, which "purport to state a 
legal truth. . . • To show the truth of the proposition, one needs to 
employ legal forms of argument; the use of those legal forms shows 
the truth of the proposition in question and justifies the assertion of its 
truth."53 He contends that "[p]articipants in the default rules debate 
in contract are engaged in a pseudo-debate because they confuse justiN 
fication of propositions about law with justifications of propositions of 
law."54 
Patterson's distinction is plausible and attractive. Indeed, it is 
plausible precisely because it is so widely accepted. When I advanced 
my arguments about a consent theory, I did not think that I was 
employing characteristically legal arguments; I did not think that I was 
using paradigmatic legal forms. Nor do I think that any economist or 
communitarian relational theorist is confused about this. But if it is 
implausible to suppose that thoughtful legal theorists are fundamenM 
tally confused about the nature of the justifications they offer, then 
what remains of Patterson's critique? If Patterson's critique is imporM 
tant, it is not because others are confused about what they are doing, 
but because they are mistaken. 
I contend that what separates Patterson from most of those he 
criticizes is not that he grasps a distinction that they have missed, but 
that in his view legal decisions can only be "explained" or legitimized 
51. See Patterson, supra note 11. 
52. Id. at 239-40. 
53. Id. at 240. 
54. ld. 
. 
[Vol. 3:4211993] .•. AND CONTRACTUAL CONSENT 439 
by arguments grounded in accepted legal forms-forms of reasoning 
that other theorists either reject or ignore. For example, I submit, 
without taking the time to prove it, that most legal economists have 
little or no theoretical regard for common-law reasoning. For most, 
the common law is a black box producing grist for the efficiency mill. 
The fact that common-law rules so often appear to be efficient 
remains a mystery and one that economists have long since given up 
trying to explain. 55 Because, as I suggested in Part I, legal economists 
have tended to remain silent about the philosophical status of their 
project, it is difficult to attribute to them a particular consciousness 
about their work. Nonetheless, implicit in their discourse (whether 
they think so or not) is the claim that common-law rules have no value 
unless supported by an efficiency analysis. 
In the default rules literature, as Patterson has noted, economists 
often claim to be providing "a theory of how courts and legislatures 
should set default rules."56 That is, they imply that courts should use 
an efficiency analysis-perhaps exclusively-to reach their results, or 
at least in their effort to decide upon the legal rules they will follow. 
Yet it is undeniable that very few decisions have ever been made in 
this way. I and, I suspect, many others would be quite tincomfortable 
letting judges even make the attempt. I have far more confidence in 
judges using what Patterson calls the legal forms than I would having 
them constantly engage in explicit economic analysis. 
Patterson's characterization of communitarian relational theory is 
equally astute. What makes this approach so threatening to many is 
not its ideological agenda-a great many academics adopt much the 
same political stance. What is disturbing is the willingness to discard 
the legal way of thinking. The relational approach described by 
Feinman, based on some unspecified mix of "norms, insights, argu-
ments, and rules of thumb,"57 seems just too open-ended and uncer-
tain to be safe. 
To this point I have endorsed Patterson's critique of others. 
What do I have to say for myself? I plead not guilty. An entitlements 
approach-of which a consent theory is a part-shares much in com-
mon with the other theories that Patterson criticizes. It is indeed a 
55. For a good example of these efforts, see Symposium, Change in the Common Law: 
Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1980). 
56. Patterson, supra note 11, at256 (quoting Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 91) (empha-
sis added). 
57. Feinman, supra note 4, at 54. 
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theory about and not of law-at least in part. And yet it is neither 
incompatible with the legal reasoning processes in which judges and 
lawyers engage nor irrelevant to it. 
According to an entitlements approach, the relevant moral issue 
when evaluating legal decisions is the force that these decisions bring 
to bear on persons. It asks whether the decision to use force is mor-
ally justified or unjustified. It evaluates the outcomes of a legal sys-
tem and passes judgment upon them. To this point, Patterson's 
critique of an entitlements approach is correct. It is a theory about 
law. However, in evaluating the decisions that judges and legislatures 
reach, an entitlements approach need not, and mine does not, suggest 
how judges or legislatures should routinely go about reaching their 
decisions. And I have gone to some lengths to defend the legitimacy 
of the legal processes that formulate and apply the law. 58 What is the 
nature of this defense? 
Briefly, a commitment to an entitlements approach is only a part 
of a liberal political theory. Another commitment of liberalism is to 
the rule of law. Whereas an entitlements approach attempts to define 
the boundaries of justice within which persons are free to do as they 
please, the rule of law is needed to communicate knowledge of these 
boundaries to others. But this is only a part of its function. Theoreti-
cal understandings of justice are necessarily abstract and impossible to 
apply to any but the most obvious of cases. The problems thrown up 
by the world are far too complex to yield to armchair theory. A com-
plex and evolutionary system of conventional rules, principles, and 
procedures is also needed, in Aquinas's words, to determine what jus-
tice in a particular case may be.59 And these systems of conventions 
may vary widely among societies of different times, places, and 
cultures. 
58. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Can Justice and the Rule of Law Be Reconciled?, 11 
HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 597 (1988); Barnett, supra note 8, at 620-23. 
59. See 2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in 20 GREAT BooKS OF nm WESTERN 
WoRLD 228 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province & Daniel J. Sullivan trans., 1952). 
I d. 
Some things are ••• derived from the common principles of the natural law by way of 
conclusions; for instance, that one must not kill may be derived as a conclusion from 
the principle that one should do harm to no man. But some are derived from these 
principles by way of determination; for instance, the law of nature has it that the evil-
doer should be punished, but that he be punished in this or that way is a determination 
of the law of nature. 
Accordingly, both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those 
things which are derived in the first way are contained in human law not as emanating 
from it exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things 
which are derived in the second way have no other force than that of human law. 
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What then is the relationship between justice (as defined by enti-
tlements theory) and the conventions discovered and promulgated by 
institutions conforming to the rule of law? Justice provides a vehicle, 
not for initial rule discovery, but for criticism and rational correction 
of doctrines that have been discovered by other means. If the 
processes adopted by a legal system are sound, the law developed in 
such a system is highly likely to be consistent with the abstract 
requirements of justice. But even the best system of conventions can 
err or can paint itself into a doctrinal corner. Justice, that is to say 
entitlements theory, helps point the way to an improvement. In sum, 
the methodology of justice provides a much-needed check on the 
methodology of the rule of law. A convergence of these two "redun-
dant" methodologies begets confidence in the results that are reached. 
A divergence should stimulate a search for error, reconciliation, or 
reform.60 
No society can do without either methodology, yet many adher-
ents to economic analysis implicitly and communitarian relational the-
ory explicitly propose to discard both justice and the rule of law in 
favor of an exclusive reliance on their favored methods of decision 
making. I suggest that this is why even those who share the ideologi-
cal presuppositions of these schools of thought fail to embrace entirely 
either. This is not to say that economic analysis could not be defended 
in a similar manner as I am defending entitlements theory, but only to 
assert that it typically is not conceived of in this way. 
Patterson's approach differs from mine, however, by its apparent 
willingness to evaluate the legitimacy of legal decisions entirely from 
the internal perspective of legal reasoning and without check or sup-
plementation from the outside. In his article, he claims that "[a] con-
tract is not a certain sort of promise. Rather, a contract is a promise 
'for the breach of which the law provides a remedy.' " 61 As a state-
ment of the conventional account of contract currently prevailing in 
American law, this statement is probably correct. It is probably even 
a correct statement of a part of the current underlying theory of 
American contract law. But although an understanding of American 
contract law would include this statement, a complete understanding 
cannot be limited to this conventional account. For perhaps it is 
60. See Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought, 38 CLEV. ST. L. 
REv. 153 (1990). 
61. Patterson, supra note 11, at 236 n.3 (quoting REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRAcrs 
§ 1 (1981)). 
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wrong. By wrong, I mean that adherence to it will produce conven-
tional rules and principles that yield unjust outcomes. If so, these out-
comes will gnaw at the edges of convention and cause it to unravel. 
A well-known example of this is promissory estoppel. When con-
tractual obligation came to be conventionally conceptualized in terms 
of bargained-for consideration, it excluded from recovery some par-
ties whose claims seemed somehow to be justified. Whether or not 
this intuition was correct, it continued to gnaw at the edges of contract 
law until promissory estoppel was invented as a label to attach to cir-
cumstances in which bargained-for consideration was inadequate. All 
of this occurred within the forms of legal argumentation that Patter-
son extols. But must our understanding of this doctrinal development 
stop here? Indeed, promissory estoppel is an unsettling doctrine pre-
cisely because it is so mysterious. It cries out for a more theoretical 
account that can influence its doctrinal direction. Many have tried.62 
My admittedly extra-legal theoretical account is that in the over-
whelming number of cases where bargained-for consideration is 
absent but we nonetheless consider a promissory estoppel action to be 
appropriate, there has been a manifestation of intention to be legally 
bound.63 Of the remaining cases, many involve some sort of promis-
sory misrepresentations. In only a very small fraction of what are 
themselves extraordinary cases, our intuitions that recovery is war-
ranted are probably wrong or at least await a better account of why 
such recoveries are justified. Thus, I conclude that the doctrine of 
consideration is useful, but limited, and that the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel should be reformed. Judges not only can accomplish 
this conventionally within the normal bounds of legal discourse, but in 
my view they ought to. 
Moreover, the legal convention that Patterson recites was once 
just a theory. The definition of contract that he cites comes from the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which inherited this conception of 
contract from the first Restatement of Contracts. Both are creatures of 
the American Law Institute (~I), a private group that by means of 
its restatement projects helped shape the direction of legal decisions. 
Many participants in the ALI are law professors, as were the Official 
62. Perhaps the most impressive recent effort is Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, 
Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. Car. L. REv. 
903 (1985). 
63. See Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppe~ Con-
tract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HoFSTRA L. REv. 443 {1987). 
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Reporters for both Restatements. Both Samuel Williston and Allan 
Farnsworth had theories of contract in mind when they performed 
their tasks. In particular, Williston was a strong proponent of the 
promise theory of contract and a strong opponent of the view that 
contracts required an intention to create legal relations. This was his 
theory and it wound up in the first Restatement.64 What privileged 
Williston's theory is twofold. First, he was highly respected as an 
authority on contracts. Second, the ALI was also well respected. In 
this way, Williston's theory of contract became a part of the conven-
tional law that Dennis Patterson now recites. 
Legal theorists have long been part of what I have called the 
"electorate of law"65-that group of legal thinkers who participate in 
the evolution of law. Indeed some legal systems require judges to pay 
serious attention to the theories of legal scholars. 
The Swiss civil code testifies to the impact of legal theories on the 
legal process. The first section of the code provides that if the code 
fails to resolve a legal dispute, the judge should act as though he 
"were a legislator" in fashioning an appropriate rule. The second 
half of the provision curtails this grant of legislative freedom: the 
judge is r~quired to follow "customary law" and "those theories that 
have stood the test of time" •... Thus the Swiss judge assesses the 
leading scholarly theories and attempts to gauge their substantive 
merit66 
64. See REsTATEMENT oF CoNrRAcrs § 20 (1932). 
65. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism, 10 
HAR.v. J.L. & Ptm. PoL'Y 273, 286 (1987). 
66. See George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE LJ. 970, 990 (1981} 
(citation omitted). This important role for legal scholars is also more apparent in legal systems 
that explicitly include matters of justice or "Right" in their prevailing conceptions of law. 
[T}here is a significant difference between arguing about the content of the law (as 
Right) and arguing about what the law ought to be. Fust, judges are bound by the 
law-both in West Germany and in the United States. Yet, in neither country are they 
bound by scholarly claims of what the law ought to be. The West German Basic Law 
(Constitution) makes it clear that the "law" that binds the judges includes not only the 
enacted law but also principles of Right. Therefore, in asserting conceptions of the 
Right, German scholars engage in discourse about the criteria that in fact bind the 
courts. This does not mean that judges follow the opinions of scholars, as they follow 
legislative directives. Yet being bound by the Right means that if they concede that a 
particular position is Right, they are obligated to follow it. In contrast, in a legal system 
founded on positivism, judges would not be bound by the scholars' conception of good 
law or sound policy. The judges might well concede that the scholars' recommenda-
tions are morally right, but nonetheless could maintain that it is up to the legislatures to 
change the law. 
Id. at 986. 
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My criticism of Allan Farnsworth's excellent treatise-a criticism that 
Patterson finds fault with67-is that, in certain areas, he did not per-
form his complete duty as an authority on the law he sought to report. 
In certain substantive areas, he might also have participated in 
improving upon what he reported by resolving the tensions that 
existed when he wrote. Had he done so, his effort may well have fed 
back into the legal syst~m and been adopted by courts. 
In the final analysis, a consent theory of contract is a theory about 
law to be sure. But if it is a correct view of justice, and if our contract 
law happens as a contingent matter to be basically just, then a consent 
theory of contract is, in some sense, of the law of contracts as well-
not because it is a form of conventional legal reasoning, but because it 
inheres implicitly in our practice of legal reasoning in contract law and 
in our shared commitment to justice. That this should be so should 
come as no surprise. After all, it is explicitly a part of the English 
contract law from which our notions descended. In this manner, a 
proper theory of justice in contract-if not a consent theory then 
some other--provides both an account of what we are doing in a con-
ventional system of contract law that is basically just and a means by 
which we can see our way clear to improve upon it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the end, if contracts are inevitably incomplete and their silence 
must be filled by reference to the vast amount of tacit understandings 
that pervade human society, why should the explicit law of contract 
itself be any different? It is silent about a great deal. Legal theory 
fills the gaps in contract law. I m$tain (though I could be wrong) 
that lurking beneath our law of contract is a tacit understanding that 
obligations should not, except in extraordinary situations, be imposed 
on persons without their consent. Thus, what we articulate conven-
tionally as the doctrine of contract law can often be understood more 
fully as ways of conforming to or falling short of this tacit assumption. 
In my work, I have urged only that this tacit assumption be explicitly 
acknowledged and that its implications ought to be acted upon. 
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